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[Crim. No. 9587. In Bank. Mar. 15, 1966.) 
THE PEOPLE, Plaintiff and Respondent, v. WILLIAM 
JUNIOR CONLEY, Defendant and Appellant. 
[1J 
[2] 
[3] 
Homicide-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions. - In a 
homicide case, the refusal to instruct on manslaughter was 
prejudicial error where defendant's diminished mental capac-
ity and his intoxication were both suggested as theories on 
which manslaughter instructions were required. 
Criminal Law-Evidence-Mental State.-Evidence of defend-
ant's diminished mental capacity, whether caused by intoxica-
tion, trauma, or disease, can be used to show that he did not 
have the specific mental state essential to an offense. 
Homicide-Manslaughter-Statutory Provisions.-Since Pen. 
Code, § 192, was enacted before the concept of diminished 
capacity was developed, the enumeration of nonlllalicious crim-
inal homicides in the statutory provisions for manslaughter 
could not be exclusive: in the absence of malice, a homicide 
cannot be an offense higher than manslaughter. 
[4] Id.-Manslaughter-Voluntary Manslaughter.-A finding of 
provocation sufficient to reduce murder to manslaughter is not 
[2) See Cal.Jur.2d, Evidence, § 154; Am.Jur., Evidence (1st 
ed § 348). 
[4) See Cal.Jur.2d, Homicide, § 125; Am.Jur., Homicide (1st 
cd § 19). 
McK. Dig. References: [1,9] Homicide, § 270; [2] Criminal Law, 
~ 403; [3] Homicide, § 19: [4] Homicide, § 22; [5, 7] Homicide, 
§ 197; [6, 21] Homicide, § 10; [8] Homicide, §§ 157, 159 (1); [10] 
Homicide, § 239; [11, 14-16, 18-20] Homicide, § 13; [12] Homicide, 
~179(3); [13] Homicide, §§13, 21; [17] Homicidc, §15(2); 
[22] Criminal Law, §§ 25, 37; Homicide, § 10; [23] Criminal Law, 
§§ 25, 37; [24] HOlllicide, § 21; [25] Criminal Law, § 777; [26, 27] 
Criminal Law, § 551(4); [28] Homicide, § 118. 
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the sole means of negating malice and establishing voluntary 
manslaughter. Unless justified or excused, an intentional kill-
ing by one incapable of harboring malice aforethought because 
of a mental disease, defect, Or intoxication is voluntary 
manslaughter. 
[6] Id.-Instructions-Defenses-Mental State.-Defend'ant's plea 
of "not guilty" to a first degree murder charge put in issue the 
existence of the mental states that are elements of that offense, 
namely, intent, deliberation, wilfulness, premeditation, and 
malice aforethought. Introduction of any evidence deserving 
of consideration that defendant lacked anyone of these mental 
states entitled him to an instruction on the effect of this lack. 
[6] ld.-Mental State.-The defense of mental illness not amount-
ing to legal insanity is a significant issue in any homicide case 
in which it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and 
effect are to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsi-
bility prescribed by the M'Naughton rule. 
[7] ld. - Instructions - Defenses - Mental State. - Under the 
Wells-Gorsken rule of diminished responsibility, a defendant 
legally sane according to the M'Naughton test but suffering 
from a mental illness that prevented his acting with mali, '! 
aforethought or with premeditation and deliberation cannot be 
convicted of first degree murder. Where there is evidence to 
inform the court that defendant is relying on the d~fense of 
diminished mental responsibility, the court, on its own motion, 
must instruct the jury on the legal significance of such evi-
dence. 
[8] ld.-Evidence-Mental State: Defenses.-Implicit in defend-
ant's defense to a murder charge on the theory of unconscious-
ness, supported by evidence of his intoxication, mental illness, 
and his testimony that he did not recollect the shooting and 
did not intend to kill, was the defense of diminished mental 
capacity. The jury could reject the claim of complete uncon-
sciousness and yet believe that the evidence introduced to 
establish unconsciousness was sufficient to indicate a substan-
,tial reduction of defendant's mental capacity. 
[9] ld.-Appeal-Reversible Error-Instructions.-Where the jury 
was not advised that diminished mental capacity could negate 
the existence of malice and that defendant's homicides could 
not be murder absent malice, despite evidence of defendant's 
diminished mental capacity when he shot and killed two per-
sons, the withholding of this material issue from the jury was 
in itself a miscarriage of justice and required reversal. 
[10] ld.-Verdict.-A jury verdict of first degree murder with a 
finding that defendant's act was intentional, voluntary, delib-
, erate and premeditated was not necessarily a finding that de-
fendant acted with malice aforethought where that issue was 
Dot presented to the jury. 
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[11] Id.-Murder-Malice.-The provisions of Pen. Code, § 188, 
create a presumption of malice when the commission of a 
homicide by defendant has been proved and place the burden 
on him to raise a reasonable doubt that malice was present. 
[12] Id.-Instructions-Malice.-The term "malice aforethought" 
imports something more than the definition of malice in Pen. 
Code, § 7, and this definition should not be read to a jury in a 
murder ease. 
[13] Id. - Murder - Malice: Manslaughter - Malice.-The words 
"malice aforethought," ordinarily used in distinguishing mur-
der from manslaughter, do not imply deliberation or the lapse 
of considerable time between the malicious intent to .take life 
and its execution, but rather denote purpose and design in 
contradistinction to accident and mischance; but this defini-
tion or test is not complete. Voluntary and some kinds of 
involuntary manslaughter may be committed with purpose and 
design, yet the law removes malice aforethought from all 
forms of ' manslaughter. 
[14] Id.-Murder-Malice.-Malicious intent is not synonymous 
with wilful, deliberate, and premeditated intent. 
[15] Id.-Murder-Malice.-The mental state constituting malice 
aforethought does not presuppose or require any ill-will or 
hatred of a particular victim. . 
[16] Id. - M.urder - Malice.-When defendant, with wanton dis-
regard for human life, does an act that involves a high de-
gree of probability that it will result in death, he acts with 
malice aforethought. 
[17] Id.-Murder-First Degree Murder-Deliberation and Pre-
meditation.-The mental state of one acting with malice afore-
thought must be distinguished from that state of mind de-
scribed as wilful, deliberate, and premeditated, which encom-
pas!.'es the mental state of one carefully weighing the course 
of action he is about to take and choosing to kill his victim 
. after considering reasons for and against it. 
[18] Id.-Murder-Malice.-Where, despite awareness of the duty 
society places on all persons to act within the law, defendant 
does an act likely to cause serious injury or death to another, 
he exhibits that wanton disregard for human life or antisocial 
motivation that constitutcs malice aforethought. 
[19] Id.-Murder-Malice.-An intentional act highly dangerous 
to human life, done in disregard of the actor's awareness that 
society requires his conduct to conform to th~ law, is done 
with malice though he acts without ill will toward his victim 
or believes his conduct justified, and it is immaterial that he 
does not know his specific conduct is unlawful, for all persons 
are presumed to know the I, IV including that prohibiting the 
causing of another's injury tJ, ueath. 
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[20] Id.-Murder-Malice.-An awareness of the obligation to act 
within the general body of laws regulating society is included 
in the statutory definition of implied malice in terms of an 
abandoned and malignant heart· and in the definition of ex-
press malice as the deliberate' intention unlawfully to take life. 
[21] Id.-Mental State.-Where, because of mental defect, disease, 
or intoxication, defendant is unable to comprehend his duty 
to govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law 
he does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty 
of first degree murder. 
[22] Criminal Law-Mental Condition-Unconsciousness: Intoxi-
cation: Homicide-Mental State.-Though unconsciousness is 
ordinarily a complete defense to a criminal charge (Pen. Code, 
§ 26, subd. Five), unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxi-
cation cannot excuse homicide. 
[2S] Id.-Mental Condition-Unconsciousness: Intoxication.-Un-
consciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is governed by 
Pen. Code, § 22, rather than § 26, and is not a defense when 
a crime requires only a general criminal intent. 
[24] Homicide-Manslaughter-Intent.-The union or joint opera-
tion of act and intent or criminal negligence must exist in 
every crime, including manslaughter (Pen. Code, § 20), and is 
deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness arising from 
voluntary intoxication. 
[25] Criminal Law-Instruetions-Intoxication.-An instruction 
that does not distinguish unconsciousness caused by voluntary 
intoxication from that induced by other causes is erroneous. 
[26] Id.-Evidence-Opinion Evidence-Sobriety.-Though ex-
pert testimony regarding defendant's inability to achieve a 
specific state of mind may be necessary when the defense of 
diminished mental capacity is based on mental disease or 
defect, expert testimony is not essential to a jury's determina-
tion that defendant had diminished capacity to achieve the 
specific state of mind because of intoxication. 
[27] leL - Evidence - Opinion Evidence - Sobriety.-Nonexpert 
witnesses may offer opinion testimony based on their observa-
tions of a person's intoxication, and the jury may infer the 
presence and extent of defendant's intoxication from evidence 
of his behavior and the amount of his drinking. 
[28] Homicide - Evidence - Photographs. - In a prosecution for 
homicides where the photographs of the victims were not in-
flammatory and were relevant to show the physical surround-
ings of the crime and the means by which wounds were in-
flicted, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in determin-
ing that their probative value outweighed any possible pre-
judicial effeet. 
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APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Mendo-
cino County. Robert L. Winslow, Judge. Reversed. 
Prosecution for murder. Judgment of conviction of first 
degree murder fixing penalty at life imprisonment reversed. 
Robert Y. Bell for Defendant and Appellant. 
Thomas C. Lynch, Attorney General, Albert W. Harris, Jr., 
Assistant Attorney General, Edward P. 0 'Brien and Robert 
R. Granucci, Deputy Attorneys General, for Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
John W. Poulos as Amicus Curiae on behalf of Plaintiff and 
Respondent. 
TRAYNOR,·C. J.-Defendant appeals from a judgment of 
conviction entered on jury verdicts finding him guilty on two 
counts of first degree murder, finding him sane at the time of 
the commission of the crimes, and fixing the penalty on each 
count at life imprisonment. He contends that the court erred 
in instructing the jury on the elements of murder, in refusing 
to give req~ested instructions on manslaughter, and in ad-
mitting into evidence photographs of the victims. 
Defendant shot and killed Clifton and Elaine McCool on 
Sunday, July 19, 1964, in Ukiah. The victims, who were mar-
ried and the parents of three children, had recently reconciled 
after a period of separation and were preparing to move to 
the State of Washington. They occupied cabin No.7 of a 
bungalow court near the home of defendant's sister, Goldie 
Haley, with whom defendant was living at the time of the 
killings. While the M:cCools were separated, Elaine became 
romantically involved with defendant and told him that she 
would get a divorce and marry him. 
Defendant injured his back in an industrial accident several 
months before the killings and had no regular employment 
since that accident. On July 15, the Wednesday before the 
shooting, he received two compensation checks and, as was his 
habit when he had funds, began a prolonged period of steady 
drinking. He and several other witnesses testified that he 
drank whiskey, vodka, and finally wine continually for over 
three days before the homicides. Defendant also testified that 
he had been ta~ing medication to relieve the pain of his back 
injury and an ulcer. A medical expert testified that some of 
the medication prescribed for defendant could have increased 
the effect of alcohol. 
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On Thursday, July 16, the defendant took Elaine and the 
McCool children on an outing and apparently engaged in 
intimate relations with Elaine. When he brought her and the 
children back to their cabin, she. told him that she had decided 
to return to her husband. 
On Sunday, July 19, defendant purchased a .30-.30 rifle 
and early that evening tried it out with two friends at a 
nearby dump. His friends testified that on their way back 
defendant said that he ought to kill the McCools, but they 
dismissed the remark as "just the booze talking" and changed 
the subject. Thereafter, defendant went to his sister's home 
and drank wine until about 9 p.m. He then went' to cabin 
No.3 of the bungalow court and told other friends who lived 
there that he was going to kill the McCools because, "I have 
been hurt by three different women before. I can't take any 
more. She promised to marry me." They attempted to dis-
suade him; but he said he had made up his mind. Once again, 
however, he was not taken seriously and his friends allowed 
him to leave with his rifle. 
A few minutes later, four shots rang out. Upon hearing the 
first shots, the occupants of cabin No.1 went to their front 
porch and saw defendant shoot Elaine as she was running 
from him. Defendant walked back to cabin No.3, told his 
friends that he had killed the McCools, and then went to his 
sister's house and told her what he had done. He left and was 
found two hours later in a nearby field. 
Defendant testified that he did not intend to kill the 
McCools and remembered nothing from the time he was 
drinking at his sister's house until his arrest. The results 
of a blood alcohol test given about three hours after the shoot-
ing showed that his blood then contained .21 percent alcohol. 
A medical expert testified that this alcohol level would be 
sufficient to impair fine muscular coordination and judgment 
in the average individual and that if defendant had consumed 
no food or alcohol between 9 p.m. and midnight, the blood 
alcohol level at 9 p.m. could have been .27 percent, but that 
it might have been even less than .21 percent. 
A defense psychologist testified that in his opinion defend-
ant was in a dissociative state at the time of the killings and 
because of personality fragmentation did not function with 
his normal personality. 
[1] Both sides requested manslaughter instructions. The 
court ruled that even if initially there had been adequate prov-
ocation to reduce the killing from murder to manslaughter, 
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a sufficient cooling period llad elapsed as a matter of law to 
preclude consideration of the crime as having been committed 
in the heat of passion. The court suggested that if either party 
could present an evidentiary theory upon which a man-
slaughter instruetion could be based it would be given but 
ultimately refused any such instruction, although diminished 
capacity and intoxication were both suggested as theories upon 
which instructions on manslaughter were required. This re-
fusal was prejudicial error. 
[2] It has long been settled that evidence of diminished 
mental capacity, whether caused by intoxication, trauma, or 
disease, can be used to show that a defendant did not have a 
specific mental state essential to an offense. Seventeen years 
ago, in People v. Wells, 33 Ca1.2d 330 [202 P.2d 53], we held 
that evidence must be admitted that shows that at the time a 
defendant committed an overt act he did or. did not have a 
specific mental state such as malice af,?rethought. By way of 
examples of the classes of crimes that require proof of a 
specific mental state we mentioned "the homicides, wherein, 
if a charge of murder in either degree is to be supported, there 
must be proof of malice aforethought; lacking proof of malice 
aforethought the homicide can be no higher offense than 
manslaughter'" (Id., at p. 346.) Section 22 of the Penal Code 
provided then, as it does now, that intoxication may be shown 
to negate an essential state of mind. We pointed out that in 
providing for the admissibility of such evidence in certain 
circumstances the statute "is but declaratory of what would 
be the rule were there no statute on the subject. • . . Thus the 
Legislature was at pains to insure that the [rule declaring no 
act less criminal because of voluntary intoxication] should 
not affect the general rule as to admissibility of evidence and 
necessity for proof relative to an essential specific state of 
mind." (ld. at p. 357.) We concluded, therefore, that evi-
dence of an accused's abnormal mental condition that was 
relevant to malice aforethought was admissible, for malice 
aforethought was a "particular purpose, motive, or intent" 
essential to the crime charged. "Here, the offer was to show 
not insanity, not a lack of mental capacity to have malice 
aforethought, but, rather, the fact of nervous tension and that 
the particular tension was directly relevant to the issue of 
'purpose, motive, or intent'; i.e., to the critical question as to 
whether defendant's overt act was done with 'malice afore-
thought' .... " (Id. at pp. 356-357.) 
We thus clearly recognized tllat maliee aforetllOught is a 
specific mental state and that a defendant IDay show that he 
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lacked that mental state when it is an essential element of the 
offense of which he stands accused. Since Wells had not com-
mitted a homicide, however, it remained for later cases to 
demonstrate the applicability of the general rule to the man-
slaughter-murder distinction. . It is now urged by amicus 
curiae that evidence of diminished capa.city can serve to 
reduce murder from first degree to second degree, but not to 
reduce murder to manslaughter, on the ground that the latter 
class of offenses is restricted to homicides having the specific 
statutory elements prescribed by Penal Code section 192.1 
This misunderstanding may have arisen from the statement 
in People v. Danielly, 33 Ca1.2d 362 [202 P.2d 18], decided 
at the time of the Wells case, that" To reduce a homicide from 
the class of murder to that of manslaughter the evidence must 
be such as to reasonably lead the jury 'to .believe that the 
defendant did, or to create a reasonable doubt in their minds 
as to whether or not he did, commit his offense under a heat 
of passion .... ' " (ld., at p. 377.) This statement, made in 
reference to evidence that the court found insufficient to estab-
lish "heat of passion," has been interpreted as limiting the 
rule of the Wells case to allow a showing only of impairment 
of a defendant's ability to premeditate or deliberate and thus 
reduce an offimse from first degree to second degree murder. 
(See 22 So. Cal.L. Rev. 471, 473.) Read in its proper context 
the statement implies no such limitation, as People v. Gorshen, 
51 Cal.2d 716 [336 P.2d 492], demonstrates. 
In the Gorshen case we considered the specific question: 
can "evidence of a defendant's abnormal mental or physical 
condition (whether caused by intoxication, by trauma, or by 
disease, but not amounting to legal insanity or unconscious-
ness) . . . be considered to rebut malice aforethought and in-
tent to kill in a case . . . where the prosecution evidence shows 
infliction of a mortal wound for the purpose of killing and 
the evidence does not show provocation which would meet the 
law's definition of voluntary manslaughter, ... " (ld. at 
p.731.) In resolving this question in the affirmative we over-
ruled earlier cases that held that the question whether the 
1 Penal Code, section 192, provides: .. Manslaughter is the unlawful 
killing of a human being without malice. It is of three kinds: 
"1. Voluntary-upon a sudden quarrel or heat of passion. 
"2. Involuntary-in the commission of an unlawful act, not amount· 
ing to felony; or in the commission of a lawful act which might produce 
death, in an unlawful manner, or without due caution and circumspec· 
tion; provided that this subdivision shall not apply to acts committed 
in the drivin&" of a vehicle. 
"3. In the drivin&" of a vehicle- . • • ." 
,I 
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defendant was guilty of murder or manslaughter is to be 
decided solely on the basis of the reasonable man objective 
standard of provocation and also overruled those cases that 
held that voluntary intoxication could not be considered on 
the question whether the defendant is guilty of murder or man· 
slaughter. [3] We thus gave effect to the statutory require. 
ments for the offense of manslaughter, "the unlawful killing 
of a human being without malice," and recognized that since 
the statute had been enacted before the concept of dimin. 
ished capacity had been developed, its enumeration of non· 
malicious criminal homicides did not include those in which 
the lack of malice results from diminished capacity. That 
enumeration could not be exclusive, for in the absence of 
malice a homicide cannot be an offense higher than man· 
slaughter. (Jackson. v. Superior Court, 62 Ca1.2d 521, 525 
[42 CaLRptr. 838, 399 P.2d 374] ; People v. Wolff, 61 Cal.2d 
795, 819 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959] ; People v. Bender, 
27 Ca1.2d 164, 180 [163 P.2d 8] ; People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 
82 [153 P.2d 21] ; People v. KeUcy, 208 Cal. 387, 393 [281 P. 
609].) [4] Accordingly, a finding of provocation sufficient 
to reduce murder to manslaughter is not the sole means by 
which malice can be negated and voluntary manslaughter 
established.: A person who intentionally kills may be incapable 
of harboring malice aforethought because of a mental disease, 
defect, or intoxication, and in such case his killing, unless 
justified or· excused, is voluntary manslaughter. (People v. 
Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 490-491 [35 Cal.Rptr. 77, 386 P.2d 
677] ; PeopZe v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 732; People v. 
Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 180.) 
In the present case the jury was instructed that "You 
sllOuld find Mr. Conley guilty of first degree murder if you 
nre convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that any shooting of 
either of the McCools was deliberate and premeditated as [the 
court haR] defined those terms and that Mr. Conley was con· 
scious of the shooting at the time." The jury was not ad· 
"hIed that malice was also an essential element of murder. 
[5] Defendant's plea of "not guilty" to the charge of first 
degree murder put in issue the existence of tIle mental states 
that are element., of that offense, namely, intent, deliberation, 
wilfulness, premrdit.at.ion, and malice aforet.hought.2 (People 
2" Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, with malice afore· 
thought." (Pen. Code, § 187.) "All murder which is perpetrated by 
lI1<'nnR of poison, or lying ill wait, tort.ure, or by any other kind of 
wilful, deliberate, and premeditated killing, . . • is murder of the first 
i 
I 
I 
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v. Henderson, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 489; People v. Modesto, 
59 Ca1.2d 722, 730 [31 Cal.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33] ; People v. 
Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 733; People v. Wells, supra, 
33 Cal.2d 330, 347.) Accordingly, the introduction of any evi-
dence deserving of consideration that defendant lacked any 
one of these mental states entitled him to an instruction as to 
the effect of this lack. (People v. Modesto, supra, 59 Ca1.2d 
722, 729; People v. Carmen, 36 Ca1.2d 768, 772-773 [228 P.2d 
281].) [6] "[T]he defense of mental illness not amount-
ing to legal insanity is a 'significant issue' in any case in which 
it is raised by substantial evidence. Its purpose and effect are 
to ameliorate the law governing criminal responsibility pre-
scribed by the M'Naughton rule. . .. [7] Under the Wells-
Gorshen rule of diminished responsibility even though a de· 
fendant be legally sane according to the M'Naughton test, 
if he was suffering from a mental illness that prevented his 
acting with malice aforethought or with premeditation and 
deliberation, he cannot be convicted of murder of the first 
degree . . . and where ... substantial evidence sufficient to 
inform the court that defendant is relying upon the defense 
of diminished responsibility is received, it must on its own 
motion instruct the jury as to the legal significance of such 
evidence, for such an instruction is 'necessary for the jury 
to be fully and fairly charged upon the relevant law.' " 
(People v. Henderson, supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 490-491.) 
[8] Hoping to gain complete exculpation, defendant based 
his defense in part on a theory of unconsciousness. In support 
of that defense he introduced evidence of iutoxication and 
mental illness and testified that he had no recollection of the 
shootings and did not intend to kill the McCools. Implicit in 
such a defense is also the defense of diminished capacity. 
The jury could well reject the claim of complete unconscious-
ness and yet believe that the evidence introduced to establish 
unconsciousness was sufficient to indicate that defpndant's 
mental capacity was substantially reduced. Counsel for both 
sides made known to the court defendant's reliance on the 
defense of diminished capacity. [9] Since the jury was not 
advised that diminished capacity could negate the existence 
of malice and that if malice were absent the offense could not 
be murder, a material issue was withheld from its considera-
tion. The denial of the right to have a significant issue deter-
degree: •.. " (Pen. Code, § 189.) "In every crime or public offense 
there mUBt exiBt a union, or joint operation of act ·and intent, . . ." 
(Pen. Code, § 20.) 
) 
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mined by the jury is in itself a miscarriage of justice within 
the meaning of article VI, section 4l;2, of the Constitution and 
requires reversal (People v. Gilbert, 63 Cal.2d 690, 703-704 
[47 CalRptr. 909, 408 P.2d 365].) 
[10] The Attorney General contends, however, that the jury 
necessarily determined this issue under the instructions given 
by finding defendant guilty of first rather than second degree 
murder. There is no merit in this contention, for the issue of 
malice aforethought was not presented to the jury. In the 
Gorshen case we emphasized that malice is a necessary element 
of both degrees of murder and that although a specific intent 
. to kill is not a necessary element of second degree murder, it 
is of both first degree murder and voluntary manslaughter. 
We thus made it clear that the mental state existing when a 
defendant has a specific intent to kill is not necessarily the 
mental sta~ known as malice aforethought. We also pointed 
out that when used in the statute defining murder that term 
imports something more than malice as defined in Penal Code 
section 7, subdivision 4, as "a wish to vex, annoy, or injure 
another person, or an intent to do a wrongful act, . . ." 
(PeopZe v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal,2d 716, 730.) In re-
turning a verdict of first degree murder, the jury found that 
defendant's act was intentional, voluntary, deliberate, and 
premeditated. They did not necessarily find, however, that 
defendant acted with malice aforethought. 
We have previously noted the difficulty of formulating a 
comprehensive definition of malice aforethought that will serve 
to distinguish murder and manslaughter. [11] Penal Code 
section 188 provides that malice "may be express or implied. 
It is express when there is manifested a deliberate inten-
tion unlawfully to take away the life of a fellow-creature. It 
is implied, when no considerable provocation appears, or 
when the circumstances attending the killing show an aban-
doned and malignant heart." These provisions create a pre-
sumption of malice when the commission of a homicide by 
the defendant has been proved and place the burden on him 
to raise a reasonable doubt in the minds of the jurors that 
malice was present. (Jackson v. Superior Court, 62 Cal2d 
521, 526 [42 CalRptr. 838, 399 P .2d 374].) The" conclusive 
presumption" of a malicious and guilty intent set forth in 
section 1962 of the Code of Civil Procedure offers no help to 
the jury. To bring it into operation the jury must find "the 
deliberate commission of an unlawful act for the purpose of 
injuring another, " which involves subjective factors on which 
) 
) 
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evidence of diminished capacity is also relevant. (People v. 
Gorshen, supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 731.) [12] As noted above, 
the term imports something more than the definition given in 
section 7 of the Penal Code when used in statutes relating 
specifically to homicides. Indeed, section 7 's definition of 
malice should not be read to a jury in a murder case. (People 
v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 731; People v. Chavez, 37 
Ca1.2d 656, 666 [234 P.2d 632].) 
The instructions given to the jury in the present case were 
phrased in language more meaningful to the average layman 
than the standard jury instructions in CALJIC. In attempt-
ing to adapt the CALJIC instructions to the facts of this case 
and to simplify the language, however, the court failed to 
define malice or instruct the' jury that a finding of malice was 
essential to a verdict convicting the defendant of murder in 
either degree. [13] "'Malice aforethought is a term ordi-
narily used in connection with the felonious killing which is 
murder to designate it from manslaughter. The words do not 
imply deliberation or the lapse of :considerable time between 
the malicious intent to take life and its actual execution, but 
rather denote purpose and design itt contradistinction to acci-
dent and mischance. . . .' But this is not a sufficiently com-
plete definition or test, for (a) voluntary and some kinds of 
involuntary manslaughter may in fact be committed with 
purpose and design, yet the law removes malice aforethought 
from all forms of manslaughter .... " (People v. Gorshen, 
supra, 51 Cal.2d 716, 730, fn. 11.) [14] '" [M]alicious in-
tent'is not synonymous with 'willful; deliberate, and premedi-
tated' intent." (People v. Holt, 25 Ca1.2d 59, 70 [153 
P.2d 21].) 
[15] The mental state constituting malice aforethought 
does not presuppose or require any ill will or hatred of the 
particular victim. (People v. Bender, supra, 27 Ca1.2d 164, 
180.) [16] When a defendant '" with wanton disregard 
for human life, does an act that involves a high degree of 
probability that it will result in death,' " he acts with malice 
aforethought. (People v. Washington, 62 Ca1.2d 777, 782 
[44 Cal.Rptr. 442, 402 P.2d 130] ; People v. Thomas, 41 Ca1.2d 
470, 480 [261 P.2d 1] [concurring opinion].) [17] This 
mental state must be distinguished from that state of mind 
described as "wilful, deliberate, and premeditated," how-
ever. The latter phrase encompasses the mental state of one 
who carefully weighs the course of action he is about to take 
.. c.Jd-ll 
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and chooses to kill his victim after considering the reasons 
for and against it. (People v. Robillard, 55 CaUd 88, 95 [10 
Cal.Rptr. 167, 358 P.2d 295, 83 A.L.R.2d 1086].) A person 
capable of achieving such a mental state is normally capable 
also of comprehending the duty society places on all persons 
to act withIn the law. [18] If, despite such awareness, he 
does an act that is likely to cause serious injury or death to 
another, he exhibits that wanton disregard for human life 
or antilUlcial motivation that constitutes malice aforethought. 
[19] An intentional act that is highly dangerous to human 
life, done in disregard of the actor's awareness that society 
requires him to conform his conduct to the law, is done with 
malice regardless of the fact that the actor acts without ill 
will toward his victim or believes that his conduct is justified. 
In this respect it is immaterial that he does not 'know that· 
his specific conduct is unlawful, for all persons are presumed 
to know the law including that which prohibits causing in-
jury or death to another. [20] An awareness of the obliga-
tion to ~ct within the general body of laws regUlating society, 
however, is included in the statutory definition of implied 
malice in terms of an abandoned and malignant heart and in 
the definition of express malice as the deliberate intention 
unlawfully to take life. 
Thus, one who commits euthanasia bears no ill will toward 
his victim and believes his act is morally justified, but he 
nonetheless acts with malice if he is able to comprehend that 
sOciety prohibits his act regardless of his personal belief. 
[21] If because of mental defect, disease, or intoxication, 
howcver, the defendant is unable to comprehend his duty to 
govern his actions in accord with the duty imposed by law, 
he does not act with malice aforethought and cannot be guilty 
of murder in the first degree. The situation of an individual 
who kills with intent, deliberation, and premeditation, but 
without malice aforethought is illustrated by the evidence in 
the Gorsken case. Had the trial court in that case believed 
the defendant's testimony, it might have concluded that he 
acted without malice when, after an altercation with his fore-
man and after consuming a large quantity of alcohol, he went 
to his home, got his pistol, fired a shot in his living room, 
drove back to his place of employment, and then after being 
searched by two police officers (who did not find his gun) 
and while still in their company shot the foreman. The psychi-
atric expert urged that because of personality disintegration 
and paranoic schizophrenia the defendant believed the act 
j 
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necessary to prevent his own insanity and that the defendant 
was incapable of having the "mental state which is required 
fo!;, malice aforethought, or preIij.editation or anything which 
implies intention, deliberation, or premeditation." (People 
v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 723.) The defendant had 
testified that he had forgotten about" God's laws and human's 
laws and everything else." (ld.) Confronted with this evi-
denee, the eourt or a jury could conclude that tIle defendant 
killed intentionally, with premeditation and deliberation, but 
did not do so with malice aforethougllt. Although legally sane 
according to the M'Naughton test, such a defendant could not 
be convicted of murder if mental illness prevented his acting 
with malice aforethought. (People v. Wolff, 61 Ca1.2d 795, 
819 [40 Cal.Rptr. 271, 394 P.2d 959] ; People v. Henderson, 
supra, 60 Ca1.2d 482, 490.) Similarly in the present case, the 
jury could have found that although defendant deliberated 
and premeditated the killings, his intoxication and mental dis-
order precluded malice aforethought. In finding him guilty 
of first degree murder under the instructions given it there-
fore did not neeessarily determine that he acted with malice 
aforethought. . 
Inasmuch as reversal is required and similar issues will 
undoubtedly be raised on retrial we deem it advisable to com-
ment on the defendant's theory that unconsciousness would 
be a complete defense to the murder charge. The court in-
structed the jury in accord with this theory tIl at "If you are 
convinced that William Conley shot either of the McCools, 
you will then have to decide whether such shooting occurred 
without the defendant William Conley, being conscious of the 
shooting. If he shot either of said persons without being con-
scious of the shooting, he would not be guilty of a erime, and 
your verdict as to any such shooting would be not guilty." 
Defendant offered evidence of intoxication caused by al-
cohol and drugs to support his deff'nse of unconsciousness. 
[a2] Unconsciousness is ordinarily a complete defense to a 
criminal charge. (Pen. Code, § 26. suhd. Five.) If the state 
of unconsciousness is causpd by voluntary intoxication, how-
ever, it is not a complpte defense. Intoxication can so diminisll 
a person's mental capacity that he is unable to achieve a 
specific state of mind requisite to a crime. but, ('ven if it is 
sufficient to destroy volition. it <'allnot excuse homicide. 
(People v. Baker, 42 Cal.2d 550. ii7!i r268 P.2d 705].) 
[a3] Unconsciousness caused by voluntary intoxication is 
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governed by Penal Code section 22,3 rather than section 26, 
and it is not a defense when a crime requires only a general 
criminal intent. (People v. Gorshen, supra, 51 Ca1.2d 716, 
727; People v. Baker, supra, 42 Ca1.2d 550, 575; People v. 
Sanchez, 35 Ca1.2d 522, 531 [219 P.2d 9].) [24] The union 
or joillt operation of act and intent or criminal negligence 
must exist in every crime, including manslaughter (Pen. Code, 
§ 20), and is deemed to exist irrespective of unconsciousness 
arising from voluntary intoxication. [25] An instruction 
that does not distinguish unconsciousness caused by voluntary 
intoxication from that induced by other causes is erroneous.4 
It is urged that no instruction on manslaughter need be 
given when a defense of unconsciousness caused by voluntary 
intoxication is presented unless the defense is supported by ex-
3Pcnal Code section 22 provides: "No act committed by a person 
while in a state of voluntary intoxication iH less criminal by reason of 
his having been in such condition. But whenever the actual existence 
of any particular purpose, motive, or intent is a necessary element to 
constitute any particular species or degree of crime, the jury may take 
into consideration the fact that the accused was intoxicated at the time, 
in determining the purpose, motive, or intent with which he committed 
the act." 
41n adapting its instructions to a case such as this in which diminished 
capacity 'and unconsciousness because of voluntary intoxication are 
relied on by the defense, the felony murder doctrine is not involved, and 
there is no evidence of poisoning, torture, or lying in wait, the eourt 
might advise the jury: 
Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being with malice afore-
thought. 
Sucb malice may be express or implied. It is express when there is 
manifested a deliberate intention unlawfully to take away the life of a 
fellow ereature. It is implied when no eonsiderable provocation appears, 
or when tbe circumstances attending the killing sbow an abandoned and 
malignant heart. 
The law prohibits acts highly dangerous to human life that eause 
serious injury or death, unless legal eause or excuse is shown. Malice 
aforethought, eithcr express or implied. is manifested by the doing of 
slIch an act by a person who is able to comprehend this prohibition and 
his ohligation to conform his coniluct to it. There is a presumption that 
the defendant was able to understand this prohibition but he may 
rclmt the presumption by evidence of diminished capacity on which I 
I<hall instruct you shortly. Malice dOL'S 1Iot require a pre-existing hatred 
or enmity toward the person injured. 
All murder perpetrat('d hy any kind of wilful, deliberate, and pre-
m('ditated killing is murder of the first degree. (To be followed here by 
fletillitions of deliberation and premeditation as in customary instruc-
tions.) 
Murder of the sccond degree must be distinguished not only from 
Illurder of the first degree, but also from manslaughter. Manslaugbter 
HhortIy will be defined for you, and you will notc tbat an essential feature 
of that offense, whit'h distinguishes it from murder, is thnt the killing 
bc ,lone without malice, 
If the unlawful Idlling of a hUlllan bt,ing is done with malicc afore-
thought, hut without nplih(",,,tion nllrl premcditation, Hlllt i8,· without 
the wilful, deliberate and Pfl'lllCditlited intent to take life that is an 
I 
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pert testimony regarding diminished capacity. [26] Although 
expert testimony with regard to a defendant's inability to 
achieve a specific state of mind may be necessary when the 
defense of diminished capacity. is based upon mental disease 
or defect, such testimony is not essential to a determination 
by a jury that a defendant has diminished capacity to achieve 
a specific state of mind because of intoxication. [27] Non-
expert witnesses may offer opinion testimony based on their 
observations as to a person's intoxication (People v. Monteith, 
73 Cal. 7, 9 [14 P. 373]) and the jury may infer the presence 
and extent of a defendant's intoxication from evidence of his 
behavior and the amount of his drinking. (Cf. People v. 
Rittger, 54 Cal.2d 720, 730 [7 Cal.Rptr. 901, 355 P .2d 645].) 
essential element of first degree murder, then the offense is murder in 
the second degree. 
The defendant has offered evidence that because of mental illness 
and intoxication he was unconscious. If you find that he was conscious 
of the shootings, but had substantially reduced mental capacity because 
of mental illness or intoxication, you must consider what effect, if any, 
this diminished capacity had on the defendant '8 ability to form any of 
the specific mental states that are essential elements of murder, which I 
have defined for you, or of manslaughter, which I will define shortly. 
Thus, if you find that the defendant killed Mr. or Mrs. McCool while 
eonscious and with malice, you will return a verdict of murder. If you 
find that this murder was committed wilfully, deliberately, and with 
premeditation, you will find the murder to be of the first degree. If you 
find, however, that the defendant's mental capacity was so diminished 
that he did not, or you have a reasonable doubt whether he did, pre-
meditate, deliberate, or form an intent to kill, you will find the murder 
to be of the second degree. 
Premeditation, deliberation, an intent to kill, and malice must be 
present for the killing to be first degree murder. 
Malice is an essential element of either degree of murder. Therefore, 
if you find that the defendant did not harbor malice because of his 
diminished capacity, or have a reasonable doubt whether he harbored 
malice, you cannot find him guilty of a higher offense than manslaughter. 
Manslaughter is the unlawful killing of a human being without malice. 
Two kinds of manslaughter, the definit.ions of which are pertinent here, 
are: 
1. Voluntary manslaughter, an intentional killing in which the law, 
recognizing human frailty, permits the defendant to establish the lack 
of malice either by 
a. Showing provocation such as to rouse the reasonable man to heat 
. of passion or Budden quarrel. When such provocation is shown, the law 
will presume that the defendant who acts in the heat of passion or on 
sudden quarrel, acts without malice. I instruct you that as a matter of 
law no such provocation was shown to exist at the time of the killing of 
Mr. and Mrs. McCool. Or by 
b. Showing that due to diminished capacity caused by mental illness, 
mental defect, or intoxication, the defendant did not attain the mental 
IItate constituting malice. 
2. Involuntary manslanghter is a killing in the commission of an un-
lawfulaet not amounting to a felony, or in the commission of a lawful 
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[28] Defendant contends also that the trial court erred in 
admitting photographs of the bodies of Clifton and Elaine 
McCool on the ground that the prejudicial effect of the photo-
graphs outweighed any probative value they might have. The 
photographs 3;re not inflammatory and are relevant to show 
the physical surroundings of the crime and the means by 
which the wounds were inflicted. The trial court did not abuse 
its discretion in determining that their probative value out-
weighed any possible prejudicial effect. (People v. Harrison, 
59 Ca1.2d 622, 627 [30 Cal.Rptr. 841, 381 P .2d 665] .) 
The judgment is reversed. 
Peters, J., Tobriner, J., Peek, J., and Burke, J., concurred. 
MOSK, J.-I concur under compulsion of the first Modesto 
decision. (People v. Modesto (1963) 59 Ca1.2d 722, 730 [31 
C81.Rptr. 225, 382 P.2d 33].) 
McCOMB, J.-I dissent. In my opinion there was no preju-
dicial error. Therefore, pursuant to the mandate of article 
VI, section 41,6, of the Constitution of the State of California, 
the alleged error should be disregarded and the judgment 
affirmed" 
Respondent's petition for a rehearing was denied April 27, 
1966, and the opinion was modified to read as printed above. 
McComb, J., Mosk, J., and Burke, J., were of the opinion that 
the petition should be granted. 
act which might produce death, in an unlawful manner, or without due 
caution and circumspection. 
Thus, if you find that the defendant killed while unconscious as a 
result of voluntary intoxication and was therefore unable to formulate 
a specific intent to kill or to harbor malice, his killing is involuntary 
manslaughter. The law does not permit him to use his own vice as a 
shelter against the normal legal consequences of his aet. An ordinary 
and prudent man would not, while in possession of a dangerous weapon, 
permit himself to reach such a state of intoxication as to be unconscious 
of his actions. 
